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I. Introduction
Before the theory of consumer demand began to be formalized by Jevons,
Wairas, Marshall, Menger and others, economists frequently discussed what
they considered to be the basic determinants of wants. For example, Bentham
discusses about fifteen basic kinds of pleasures and pains —allother plea-
sures and pains are presumed to be combinations of the basic set -,andMar-
shall briefly discusses a few basic determinants of wants before moving on
to his well known presentation of marginal utility theory.1 What is relevant
and important for present purposes is the prominence given to the interactions
among individuals.
Bentham mentions "the pleasures... of being on good. terms with him or
them", "the pleasures of a good name", "the pleasures resu!ting from the view
of any pleasures supposed to be possessed by the beings who may be the objects
of benevolence", and "the pleasures resulting from the view of any pain sup-
posed to be suffered by the beings who may become the objects of malevolence".
Nassau Senior said that "the desire for distinction...is a feeling which if we
consider its universality, and its constancy, that it affects all men and at
all times, that it comes with us from the cradle and never leaves us till we
go into the grave, may be pronounced to be the most powerful of aH human
passions".2 Marshall also stresses the desire for distinction, and illustrates2
its influence by discussing food,clothing, housing, and productiveactIvities
As greater rigor permeated thetheory of Consumer demand, variables like
distinction, a good name or benevolencewere pushed further and further out of
sight. Each individual or familygenerally is assumed to have ajutIlIty func-
tion that depends directlyon the goods and services it consumes. Thisis not
to say that interactions between individuals
have been completely ignored.
Pigou, Fisher and Panteleonj at the turn ofthe century4 included attributes
of others in utility functions (butdid nothing with them). In therecent
literature, "demonstration" and "relativeincome" effects on savings andcon-
sumption,5 "bandwagon" and "snob"influences on ordinary consumption theor,6
and the economics of philanthropic contributions7have been discussed. But
these efforts have not beenunified, and, more significantly, havenot cap-
tured the dominance attributed to social
interactions by nineteenthcentury
economists.
Of course, sociologists have fora long time emphasized the central role
of interactions and their importance inthe basic structure of wantsor perso-
nal i ty. Veblen's
Conspicuous consumption andconspicuous leisure (if for this
purpose he is classified as a sociologist)
have entered ordinary discourse.
At one point he said "But it isnly when taken in a sense far removed from
its naive meaning that theconsumption of goods can be said to afford the incen-
tive from which accumulation
invariably proceeds. The motive that lies at the
root of Ownership is emulation... ."and"...theusual basis of self—respect is
the respect accorded by one's neighbors".8Interactions were also emphasized
by Durkheim, Smmel, Freud, and Weber,as well as in modern discussions of
"social exchange" and the"theory of act ion".9
My interest in interactions canprobably. be traced to a study of dis-
crimination and "prejudice",1° where Ianalysed discriminatory behavior by3
incorporatingthe race, religion, sex or other personal characteristics of
employees, fellow-workers, customers, dealers, neighbors, etc. into utility
functions. Subsequently, in order to provide a theoretical framework fora
study of philanthropy by the National Bureau of Economic Research, I incor-
porated the standard of living of "poorer" persons into the utility functions
of "richer" ones. Further reflection gradually convincedme that the em-
phasis of earlier economists deserved to be taken much more seriously because
social interactions had significance far transceidjng the specialcases dis-
cussed by myself12 and others.
This essay incorporates a general treatment of interactions into the
modern theory of consumer demand.In Section 2, various characteristics of
different persons are assumed to affect the utility functions ofsome per-
sons, and the behavioral implications are systematically explored. Section
3 develops further implications and applications in the context ofanalyzing
intra-family relations, charitable behavior, merit goods and multi—persons
interactions, and envy and hatred. The variety and significanceof these
applications is persuasive testimony not only to theimportance of social
interactions, but also to the feasibility of incorporating theminto a ri-
gorous analysis.
2. Theoretical Framework
A. Equilibrium for a Single Person
According to the modern (and very old!) theory of household behavior,'3
U. =
U1(z1,...,z) (2.1)-4-
is the utility function of the ithperson, and Z1, Z are the basic
wants or commodities. As indicated
earlier, Bentham mentions about 15
basicwants, whereas Marshall and Senió-stress an even smaller tumber.
Each person also has a set ofproduction functions that determinehow
much of these commodities
can be produced with' the marketgoods, time,
and other resources availableto him:
Z. =f(x., t., E', R!,...R') (2.2)
wherex are quantities of different market goods and
services, tj are
quantities of his own
time, E' stands for his education, experieryce, and
"environmental" variables,
and R!, ...Rare characteristics of other persons that affect hisoutput
of commodities. For example, ifZ1 measures i's distinction in his occupa-
tion, R, ... couldbe the opinions of I held by otherpersons in the
same occupation. Presumably, characteristics ofothers affect the pro-
duction of a significant fraction of commodities.
If the were completely outside l's control -thatis, unaffected
by what he does with his resources -iwould maximize U taking theR as
given. This is one way to justify the usualneglect of interactions.
They are considered beyond the control of thepersons being studied, and,
therefore, taken as given when analyzing theirreactions to changes in re-
sources and prices.
The point of departure ofmy approach is to assume the contrary; namely,
that i can change R. by hisown efforts. For example, he can avoid social
opprobrium and perhaps ostracism by notengaging in criminal activities;
achieve distinction by workingdiligently at his occupation, giving to
charities, or having a beautiful house,or relieve his envy and jealousyS
-5-
bytalking meanly about or even physically harming his neighbors. These
effects can be formalized in a production function for
the (Ri, ...Ri)]that depends partly on the efforts of i and partly on
other variables.
To simplify the discussionI4 I follow Senior and assume only a single
commodity (distinction?) that is produced with a single good (the input of
time is ignored) and a single characteristic of others. Then maximizing
utility is equivalent to maximizing the output of this commodity, and one
can write
=Z(x,R). (2.3)
Iassume also (until Section 3C) that the effect of other variables (in-
cluding the efforts of others) on this characteristic is not dependent
on i's own efforts. Therefore, R can be written as the additive function
R =D.+h, (2.4)
where h measures the effect of i's efforts, and D. the level of R when i
makes no effort; that is, D measures i's "social environment."
His budget constraint for money income can be written as
+= Ii, (2.5)
where I. is his money income, pRh is the amount he spends on R, and
is the price to him of a unit of R.-6- .
SubstituteR -
D1for h in equation (2.5)toget
+ PRR =II +pRD.
=
Si. (2.6)
The right hand side gives the sum of i's money income and the value to him of
his social environthent, and will be called his social income. The left hand
side shows how° his social income is "spent": partly on his "own" goods
(x) and partly on the characteristics of others (R).15
If i maximizes the utility —outputfunction given by equation (2.3) sub-
ject to the constraint on social income given by equation (2.6), the equili-
brium condition
U/ i =Px (2.7)
If I did not want to purchase any R, would be a "shadow" price, measured
by the monetary equivalent of the marginal utility (viz marginal product)
of R to i when R =D.(or when h =0).
His equilibrium position is shown graphically in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
The first figure assumes that R has a positive marginal product in the produc-
tion of Z (a positive marginal utility); that R refers, for example, to the
respect accorded i rather than to his envy of others. The quantity oD
measures his social environment, and ox his own income (measured in terms of
0
x), so that the "endowed" point E gives his utility when he spends nothing
on R.If E0S0 measures the opportunities available for purchasing additional
R,17 he would maximize his utility by moving alongE0S0 to point e0, where
the slope of this opportunity curve equalled the slope of his indifference
curve. His equilibrium purchase of R is measured by the line-segment h0-7-
Figure2.2 assumes that R has a negative marginal product(or utility)
because say it measures the income or prestigeof persons that I envies.
The section of the opportunity curve to the south—eastof point E0 Is now
Irrelevant; and he moves along the south-west section E0S0to point e0.
He is willing to give up resources to reduce R becausehis utility is raised
by a reduction in R; at point e, he spends enough resourcesto reduce R
by h0.
Note that since the marginal (and average) price of Ris negative in
Figure 2.2, i's socialincoe is tess than his own income because the value of
his social environment is subtracted from his own income.That is, he is made
worse off by his social environmentif it is dominated by characteristics
of others that are distasteful to him. Note too that as long asthe marginal
utility of R is not zero at the sociallyendowed position, his social income
would differ from his own income even if he did not want to spendanything
on R. He would add to (or subtractfrom) his own income the product of D
and the (monetary equivalent of the) marginal utility of R at the endowed
position E. In other words, the traditional income concept is incomplete
even when no resources are spent trying to influence theattitudes or situa
tion of others.
The analysis developed for social interactions in these figures and
in equations (2. ,(26 ), and(2.7is applicable also whenever there is
a physical environment that either can be altered directly or can have its
effects augmented or diminished. For example, the human capital of a per
son is the sum of the amount inherited and that acquired through investments;
moreover, the amount invested is partly determined by the inheritance.-8-
Orthe temperature in a house is determined by the weather andexpenditures
on fuels, insulation, etc. that reinforce or offset the natural environment.
A more general analysis, therefore, would assume thatevery term
entering the utility function has both an environmental and acquiredcompo-
nent. The general analysis could readily be developed, but I have chosen
to simplify the discussion by ignoring the non-social environment. The
results are consistent with those from the generalanalysis as long as the
contribution of the social environment is, on the whole,significantly more
important than that of the physical environment. This is assumed to betrue.
(I am indebted to Gilbert Ghez and especially Robert Barro forstressing the
general nature of the analysis).
B.Income and Price Effects
An increase in l's own income alone -withoutany change in prices or
the social environment -wouldincrease both x and R unless one were inferior.
The average percentage response in x and R per one percent change in his own
income is not unity, but is less by the fraction a, where a is the share of the
social environment in his social incom.18 Therefore, the effect of a change in
his own income on his utility-output is smaller, the more important his
social environment is.-9-
Put differently, the greater the contribution of his social environment
to his social income, the more that his welfare is determined by the attitudes
and behavior of others rather than byhis own income. Traditional models of
choice by economists assume that own efforts and access to property income
and transfer payments determine welfare. On the other hand, those who stress
the social environment, its normative requirements and sanctions for compliance
and noncompliance, and the helplessness of the individual in the face of his
environment naturally see society dominating individual efforts and, conse-
quently, see little scope for important choices by individuals.
The relative importance of the social environment, as well as other
implications of the theory of social interactions, can be empirically estimated
from information on expenditures motivated by these interactions. f i's
social environment did not change when his own income changed, the induced
absolute change in the characteristics of others would equal the change in
his contribution to these characteristics. However, the relative change in
his contribution would differ from the relative change in these characteristics
because the level of the latter is partly determined by the social environment.
Consider again Figures 2.1 and 2.2, where an increase in i's own income
with no change in the environment is shown by a vertical increase in the en-
dowed position from E to E1. Since his equilibrium position changes from e0
to e1, the change in R is exactly equal to h1 -h0,
the change in i's contribu-
tion to R.The percentage change in R in Figure 2.1 is clearly less than that
in h since R is the sum of h and (a fixed) 0. Since the percentage change in
R in Figure 2.2 is negative, it is also less than the percentage change in h,
which is positive (since h is negative). However, if R had been increased W by the increase in i's
own income -ifsay the new equilibrium position was at point e1 -,theper-
centage change in R would be positive, and would clearly exceed in algebraic.-10- .
valuethenegative percentage change inh.
The own-income elasticity of demand for contributions is related to
the elasticity of demand for characteristics by the formula




where 0 1 is the fraction of own income that is spent on contributions
to R.If a> 0, if the social environment adds to i's social income, then
clearly nh > Moreover,if n =1-a <1,necessarily nh >
1even
when <1;that is, contributions to the characteristics of others could have
a "high" income elasticity even when the characteristics themselves had a "low"
elasticity. Of course, if h >1,the own income elasticity of demand for
own consumption (n) would be less than unity. That is, social interaction
implies a relatively low income elasticity for own consumption even without
introducing transitory changes inincome,errors in variables, and the like.
Equation (2.8)further implies that an increase in a, an increase
in the social environment, with no change in the own-incomeelasticity of de-
mand for characteristics relative to the average elasticity would
increase the own-income elasticity of demand for contributions.22 In other
words, the more that i's social Income is determined by his social environment,
the greater would be the percentage change in his contributions to the charac-
teristics of others as his own income changed.
If, on the other hand, a <0-thesocial environment subtracted from
.i's social income -'thenequation (2.8)implies that h < whennR >
andh >nRwhen <0(these different cases are shown in Figure 2.2). His de-
mand for characteristics would probably be reduced by an increase in his own income
(i.e., R <0)if these characteristics have a negative marginal utility to him.
Again, an increase in a, with nR/n held constant, would raise%(theargument
in footnote 22 fully applies).
Since the social environment to any person cannot be readily observed,
an indirect method of estimating at least its sign would be useful.If
nR/n were known-, that is, if the relative income elasticity of demand for
characteristics were known, the sign of a could be estimated simply from
information on the own-income elasticity of demand for contributions to the
environment, and its magnitude from additional information on the fraction of
own income spent on these contributions. Equation (2.8) implies that
n-i-i
a=hn (2.9)
Therefore,a0 as nh_!L_1,and information on nh, 'R' andwould be
sufficient to estimate a.
An increase in a social environment that adds to i's social income would
increase his demand for own goods if they had positive income elasticities. If
his own income were unchanged, his increased expenditure on own goods has to be
"financed" by reduced contributions to the characteristics of others. Similarly,
an increase in a social environment that subtracts from his social income
would increase 'his expenditures on others and reduce his expenditures on own
goods. Consequently, the effect of a change in the environment is always (i.e.,—12-
as long as own goods are not inferior) partly offset by induced changes in
i's contributions in the opposite direction, regardless of whether the envi-
ronment adds to or subtracts from i's scal income.
-
Geometrically,a change in the social environment is shown by a hori-
zontal movement of the endowed position. An increase in the environment
shifts the endowment in Figure 2.1 from pointE1 to E2; the equilibrium posi-
tion is changed from pointe1 to a point on a higher indifference curve, (e2),
and i's contribution declines from h1 toh2. In Figure 2.2, the equilibrium
is changed from pointe1 to a point on a lower indifference curve
(e2), and
i's contribution increases from
h1 to h2.23
If both the own and environment incomes
of i changed, the effect would
be a combination of those when each alone
changed. For example, if both in-
comes increased, the effect on his contributionsof the increase in the en-
vironment would at least partly offset theeffect of the increase in hisown
income.In particular, if both incomes increasedby the same percentage, the
percentage change in contributions would be greater, equal, or smaller than
that as his demand for characteristics exceeded,equalled, or was less than
unity.
Through the assumption that is constant, I have been assuming,
in effect, that expenditures and the social environment are perfect
substitutes in producing characteristics of others.However, the qualitative
implications of this assumption can also be derived ifthey are simply
better substitutes for each other than forown consumption —j rises as h
rises, but not "too" rapidly. For example, a rise in theenvironment would
reduce contributions, and a rise in own income wouldincrease contributions
by a relatively large percentage if the environment andexpenditures on
these characteristics are simply relatively closedirect substitutes.S
—13-
A rise in the cost of changing the characteristics of others would
induce the usua.l substitut ion (and perhaps income) effects away from these
characteristics. If the environment were given, the absolute change in contri-
butions would equal the absolute change in these characteristics, while the






— FE — R 1 -a (2.10)
(same proof as in footnote 19).
Therefore, when a >0,Eh would exceed ER by an amount that would be greater,
the greater a and the smaller .Similarly,when a <0,Eh would be less
than ER24 by an amount that would be greater, the greater, the absolute value
of a and the smaller .-14-
3. App)ications
Three specific applications of the generalanalysis of social Interaction
are now considered: interactions among members of the samefamily, charity,
and envy and hatred. These applications notonly provide empirical support for
the income and price implications just derived, but alsobring out a number of
other implications of social interaction.
A. The Family
Assume that i cares about his spouse j25 in thesense that i's utility
function depends on j's welfare.I assume until much later in thissection
that j does not care positivelyor negatively about I.For simplicity, let
the variable measuring this dependence,R. ,equal
I.+h.. S.
R. = = —i-=x., (3.1) Ip p j
whereI. is -i's own income, are the contributions from i to j,Si is j's social
income, andx are the goods consumed by j. The social income of i can be
derived by substituting equation (3.1) into equation (2.6):
R1
x i +R
R. =S.=:1::.+ , (3.2)
where is the price to i of transferring resources to j.If i can
transfer resources to j without any "transactions" costs —presumably,these
costs are reduced by sharing a common household-,andif i cares sufficiently




The social income of iequalsthe combined own incomes of iandj, or the




= = 1, (34)
or I would receive equal marginal utility from j's and his own consumption.
Conditions (3.3) and (3.4) are shown graphically in Figure 3.1. Re-
sources can be transferred from i to j by moving along i's budget line in a
southeast direction from the endowed position at pointE0. The equilibrium
position is at point e, where the slope of i's indifference curvesequals the
slope of his budget line (= to -1). Thevertical (or horizontal) intercept
gives the family's own income -i's social income-, deflated by the price ofx.
An important implication of this analysis is that a change in the dis-
tribution of family income between i and j has no effect at allon the consump-
tion or welfare of either, as long as i continues to transferresources to j.
A change in the distribution would be on the same budget lineas if total
family income is unchanged: the change from E toE1 is nominally more favorable
to j, whereas the change to E2 is nominally more favorable to i. Since there
is only one point of tangency between i's budget line andan indifference
curve, the equilibrium position must be unchanged at e.A shift in favor of
j's income to E1 simply induces an equal reduction in i's contributions toj
•
(from h7. to h.'. in the figure), whereas a shiftagainst j's income to E2
26 induces an equal increase in his contributions (from to-16-
This discussion has assumed a twoperson family, but is equally applicable
to larger families that include grandparents,
parents, children, uncles, aunts,
or other kin.If one member, call him the "head",cares sufficiently about all
other members to transfer general resourcesto them7 redistribution of income
among members would not affect the consumption ofany member, as long as the
head continues 1o contribute to all.
The head's concern about the welfare of othermembers provides each,
including the head, with some insurance against disasters,If a disaster
reduced the income of one member alone, k,by say 50 per cent, the head would
increase his contributions to k, andthereby1 offset to some extent the decline
in k's income. The head would "finance" his increasedcontribution to k by
reducing his own consumption and his contributions to othermembers; in effect,
each member shares k's disaster by consuming less.If k's share of family
income were negligible, hewouldessentiallybefully insured against his own
disasters because even a 50 per cent decline in hisincome would have a negli-
gible effect on family income, and thus on theconsumption of each member.
Since the share contributed byany member would tend to be inversely related
to family size, large families, including the extendedkinship family found
in certain societies, can provide self-insuranceespecially when old-age, health,
and other kinds of market insurance are not availableor are very costly8
Note that insurance is automatically provided whenresources are voluntarily
transferred, without the need for any member to have dictatorialcontrol over
the family's allocation of resources.
This result on the unimportance of the distributionof income among person5
linked by transfers can also be used to understand the
interaction among gene-
rations?9Suppose that the resources of the present generationare changed at
the expense of or to the benefit of theresources accruing to future generations.—17-
For example, increased government debt or socialsecurity payments are financed
by increased taxes on future generations, or increased public investment,per-
haps in schools, with benefits accruing o future generationsare financed by
taxes on the present generation.If present and future generations are fully
connected by a series of intergenerational transfers, called"bequests", then
each of these apparent changes in the relativeresources of present and future
generations would tend to be offset by equal but oppositechange in bequests.
In particular, increased public debt would not raise thereal wealth or consump-
tion of the present generation nor reduce that of futuregenerations because
increased taxes on future generations would be matchedby increased bequests to
them. Similarly, increased public investment in educationwould be matched
by reduced private investment in education.30
The budget constraint of the head is determinedby total family income,
not his own income alone -equation(3.3) for a two-person family can be readily
generalized to many persons. Since the head maximizes hisutility subject to
his budget constraint, anything that increasedfamily income would increase
his utility. Therefore, the head would consider the effecton total family
income of his different actions, and would forfeitown income if the incomes of
other family members were increased even more. Forexample, he would not
move to another city if his spouse's or childrens' income would be decreased
by more than his own income would be increased. Or although childrenusually
eventually set up their own households and fully control theirown incomes, the
head would guide and help finance their investments ineducation and other
human capital to maximize the present value of the real incomeyielded by these
investments.3
Put differently, the head automatically internalizes the"external" effects
of his actions on other family mernbers.3-18-
Indeed, because the head maximizes family
income he fully internalizes these external itiesnot only when the income of
different members, but also when theirconsumption, the other side of the
budget constraint, is directly affected. He would take an action directly
affecting consumption only when either the valueof any increase in his con-
sumption exceeded the value (to him) ofany decrease in other members' con-
sumption, or whçn any decrease in his ownwas less valuable than the increase
• . 32 in theirs.
For example, he would read in bed atnight only if the value of reading
exceeded the value (to him) of the loss insleep suffered by his wife, or
he would eat with his fingers only if itsvalue exceeded the value (to him)
of the disgust experienced by his family. Thedevelopment of manners and
other personal behavior "rules" betweenfamily members well illustrates how
apparent "external" effects can be internal izedby social interaction between
members.
Note too that not only is the head betteroff when his utility is raised,
but so too are other members of hisfamily, even if his actions directly reduce
their consumption or increase their discomfortand disgust. For if his utility
is raised and if their welfare has
a positive income elasticity to him, he
would increase his contributions to themby more than enough to offset their
initial losses. For example, if he benefitsfrom reading at night, his wife
32 a does too because he more thancompensates her for her loss of sleep.
The head maximizes a utility function thatdepends on the consumption of
all family members subject to abudget constraint determined by family income
and family consumption. Therefore, theeffect of a change in relative prices
of gooàs, or in aggregate family income (aswell as in its distribution) ona
fami ly's consumption of differentgoods could be predicted solely from the
head's utility function and a budgetconstraint on family variables. The-19-
usual substitution and income effects of demand theory would be fullyapplicable.
In this sense, then, a family with a head can be said to maximize "its"
consistent and transitive utility function of the consumption of different
members subject to a budget constraint defined on family variables. The
"family's" utility function is Identical to that of one member, the head,
because his concern for the welfareof other members,so to speak, integrates
all the members,! utility functions into one consistent"family" function.
That is to say, a "family's" utility function is thesame as one of its
members not because this member has dictatorialpower over other members, but
because he (or she!) cares sufficiently about all other membersto transfer
resources voluntarily to them. Each member can have complete freedom of
action; indeed, the person making the transfers would not change theconsump-
tion of any member even with dictatorial power! For example, if i had
dictatorial power, he couldmove the equilibrium position e in Figure 3.1 to
the vertical axis (or anywhere else), but would not chooseto move it because
his utility partly depends on j's consumption.33
Nothing much has yet been said about the preferences of members whoare
not heads. The major, and somewhat unexpected, conclusionis that if
a head exists, other members also are motivated to maximize family income and
consumption, even if their welfare depends on their own consumption alone.
This is the "rotten kid" theorem. (Iowe this name to the Barro family).
For consider a selfish member j who can takean action that would reduce his
income by b, but increase that of another member kby c.Initially, j would
be worse off by b since the gain to k is of no directconcern to him. However,
if c =b,the head would transfer enough additional resources toj from k to
leave him (and k) equally well off sinceintra-family reallocations of income
S donot affect the consumption of any member. Moreover, ifc >bif family
income were raised by j's action—, and if J's welfarewere a superior "good"
to the head, then he would transfer enough additionalresources to j to make-20-
.
jbetter off. Consequently, evena selfish j would only, undertake actionsthat
raised family income orconsumption, regardless of the initial impacton him.
In other words, when one membercares sufficiently about other members
to be the head, all members have thesame motivation as the head to maximize
family opportunities, and to internalizefully all within family "externalities",
regardless of how selfish (or)indeed, how
envious) these membersare. Even a selfish child receiving
'itransfers from his parents would
yomatically consider the effects of his
actions on other siblings as wellas on his parents. Put stilldifferently,
sufficient "love" by one memberguarantees that all members act as if they
loved other members as much as themselves.As it were, the amount of "love"
required in a family is economized:
sufficient "love" byone member leads all other
members by "an invisible hand" to actas if they too loved everyone.
Armed with this theorem, I do not needto dwell on the preferences of
non-heads. Of course, just as theremay be no head if all members are suffi-
ciently selfish, so there may benone if they are all sufficiently altruistic.
Each would want to transferresources to other members, but noone would want
to accept transfers. Aside fromthat, mutual interaction or mutual
interdependence
of welfare raises no particular problems.4
By assuming in Figure 3.1 and in the formal
development given by equations
(3.1) to (3.4) that onlya single good is consumed by eachperson, Ieliminated
any distinction between transferring general
purchasing power and transferring
part i cul a r
i\goods to another member.If each member consumesmany goods, the conclusions
in this section about family
utility functions, internalization ofwithin-family
externalities, and so on fully hold only if the head iscontent to transfer
general purchasing power. He would transferin this form if his utility function
depended on the utility of other members. Thatis, if his utility function could-21-
.
bewritten in the form
Uh =Uh(xhj, XhmP l '<21 m'"9n(xni '"xnm' (3.5)
wherex.. is the quantity of the jthgood consumed by the ithperson, and
m ag.
dg.
O(=.z1 b—dx..)implies that the utility of theith person is unchanged. J
tJ
If he is concerned not about
the utility of othermembers, but their consumption
of particular "merit"goods, the conclusions can bequite different. The syste-
matic discussion of meritgoods tspostponedto section 3c.
If parents aretransferring resources to their childrenin the form say of
gifts and expenditureson education and other human
capital or after they die in
the form of bequests, then
an increase in the income of
parents by a given per-
centage would tend to increase
contributions to children bya still larger per-
centage, certainly by oneexceeding the increased welfare of theirchildren
(see the discussion inSection 2).In other words, contributionsto children
can be very responsive toa change in parental income withoutthe welfare of
children being so responsive.
Empirical evidence on bequests,gifts, and many other transfersto
children is seriously deficient.The general impressionis, however, that
bequests have a very high income
elasticity. Moreover,the elasticity ofexpenditures
on children's education with
respect to parental income doesappear to be above
unity (Schultz, p.9), which isconsistent with theimplications of thetheory.
The responsiveness ofexpenditures on children's educationand other train-
)ng and ski lis to parental income
has often been noted, ndlamented as evidence
of immobility andrigid "class" structure. Yet
my analysis implies that the
welfare of children -ameasure of their "class"-
rises by a smaller
Percentage than parental
expenditures on them, andPossibly even by a cm11.--22- fH
thanparental income. Put differently, considerable regression toward the mean
across generations -i.e., the expected income or other measure of theposition
of children would be much closer to theaverage position than is that of their
parents -,canbe observed at the same time that contributions to children are
very responsive, to parental income.35
The crucial point is that considerable regression toward the mean across
generations would occur partly because of geneticfactors and luck if allparents
spent an equal amount on their children. As a result of this and given interde-
pendent preferences, higher income parents tend to spend considerably more on
their children then lower income ones. However, these expenditures would only tend
to dampen but not eliminate the regression toward the mean. Therefore, the
elastic response of contributions to children can give a very biased picture of
the degree of immobility or inheritance of "class" position. Indeed, contri-
butions would be more responsive to parental income thestronger are the basic
forces producing mobility because parents attempt to offset these forces.In
other words, an elastic response of contributions to parental incomemay be
evidence of sizeable niobility!35a
B. Charity
If someone makes contributions of time or goods to unrelated persons or
to organizations, he is said to be "charitable" or "philanthropic". The dis-
cussion of contributions within a family indicates that charitabe behavior
can be motivated by a desire to improve the general well-being of recipients.6
Apparent "charitable" behavior can also be motivated, however, by a desire to
avoid the scorn of others or to receive socialacclaim. Not much generality is
sacrificed, however, by only considering charity motivated by a desire to improve
well-being.37—23—
The numerous implications about family behavior developed in the pre-
vious section fully apply to the synthetic "family" consisting of a chari-
table person i and all recipients of his charity. For example, no members'
well-being would be affected by a redistribution of income among them, as
long as i continued to give to all of them. For he would simply redistribute
his giving until everyone losing income was fully compensated and everyone
gaining was fully "taxed".Moreover, all members, not simply i, would try to
maximize "family" opportunities and "famMy" consumption, instead of their own
income or consumption alone.In addition, each member of a synthetic "family"
is at least partly "insured" against catastrophes because all other members,
in effect, would increase their giving to him until at least part of his loss
were replaced. Therefore, charity is a form of self—insurance that is a sub-
stitute for market insurance and government transfers. Presumably, the rapid
growth of these latter during the last 100 years discouraged the growth of
charity.
According to the analysis in Section 2, an increase in the income of a
charitable person would increase his charitable giving by a greater percentage
than the increase in the well-being of recipients. Indeed, his income elasti-
city of demand for giving would exceed unity, possibly by a substantial amount,
as long as his elasticity of demand for their well-being (which I will call
his demand for charity) was not much below
his average income elasticity. The available evidence on charitable giving
clearly supports this implication of the theory: income elasticities esti-
mated by iaussig8 from giving in different income classes in 1962
are all well above unity, ranging from a low of +1.3 in the under $25,000
class to a high of +3.1 in the $100,000 -$200,000class.
A crucial implication of an interpretation of charitable giving in terms
Sof social interaction between the giver and others is thatan increase in the
incomes of recipients would reduce giving. Therefore,an increase in the incomes S
ofboth recipients and givers should not increase givingby as much as an
increase in the incomes of givers alone. These implicationsare tested and
confirmed by Schwartz, who analyzes aggregate time serieson incomes and chari-
table giving in the United States between 1929 and 1966, and alsocompares his
findings with the cross-sectional findings of Taussig reported above39.
The usual theory of consumer chance ignores social interactions, and
would consider charitable giving simply as a "good'1 that enters thegiver's
utility function along with his other goods:
U. =U.(x., h ), (3.6)
where h measures the amount given by i, andx1 are the other goods that he
consumes. This "conventional" approach does not imply that an increase in
i's income would increase his giving by a particularly largepercentage, nor
that an increase in the incomes of recipients would lower his giving.Therefore,
considerable ad hocery would be required if the "conventional" approach were
to explain the evidence on charitable giving that is morereadily explained by
an approach that incorporates social interactions
These findings can be used to make very crude, but instructive, calcula-
tions of the share of recipient's own incomes in the social incomes of
contributors If the own income elasticity
of demand for giving is taken fromTaussig as +2.0,the share of own income
spent on giving as .04 (see Schwartz, p. 1278), and the incomeelasticity of
demand for charity as equal to theaverage income elasticity (actually,
Schwartz's findings suggest that itmay be lower than the average), then accord-
ing to equation (2.11), charity's share in social income wouldbe S
0.4.If the own income elasticity of giving were takenas +3.0S
-25-
rather than +2.0,charity's share would double to .08; if, in addition,
the income elasticity of charity were only V5 of the average elasticity, its
share would increase further to .11 (atithe ?).
-C. Merit.GoodS and Multi—Person Interactions
Contributor5 are content to transfer general purchasingpower to reci-
pients if they are concerned aboutthe general welfare or utility of recipients
-
asseen by recipients. They want to restrict or earmark their transfers, on
the other hand, if they are concernedabout particular "merit" goods consumed
by recipients. For example, parents maywant transfers to their children spent
on education or housing, or only the money incomes rather than "full"
incomes of children may be of concern to parents, orcontributors
to beggars may not want their giving spent on liquor or gambling.-26-
Assume, therefore that I transfers
resources to j that are earmarked
for particular goodsconsumed by j because theutility function of I depends
not only on his own goods butalso on these goods ofj.If j were permitted
to spend his own incomeas he wished, an assumption
modified shortly, he would
spend less on these goods asa result of the earmarkedtransfers from I.
Clearly, the reduction in hisown spending would begreater, the greater the
transfer, the smaller the fraction ofhis social income spenton these goods,
and the smaller their income
elasticity. For example, ifthey take 20 per-
cent of his social income, and have
an income elasticity equal to2.0, he would
reduce his own spendingby 60 cents for each dollarearmarked by .40
As long as j continues tospend on the merit
goods, earmarked transfers
are worth as much to j as a transferof general purchasingpower with equal
monetary value. Moreover, i would not havea greater effect on j'sconsumptjon
of these goods with earmarkedtransfers than with generaltransfers. Therefore,
as long as j continues tospend on these goods, earmarkedtransfers are
equivalent to general transfers; andthe results derived for thelatter fully
hold for the former. For
example, a redistribution of incomebetween i and j
would have no effect on the
consumption of either as long as bothcontinue to
spend on the merit goods,, or both iand j want to maximize theircombined
incomes, not their own incomes alone.
On the other hand, ifj did not want to spendanything on the merit
goods because earmarked transfers
were sufficiently large, suchtransfers would
be worth less to j andmore to i than would general transfers
with equal money
value. Moreover, variousresults derived for generaltransfers no longer holds
for example, a redistributionof income to j andaway from i would reduce j's
consumption of merit goods and increase his
consumption of other goods.-27-
If i were aware that jreducedhis spending on merit goods when transfers
increased, i would be discouraged from giving becausej's reaction raises i's
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where p is the market price of merit goods, and theother terms are defined in
footnote 1O. Similarly, if j were aware that i reduced his transfers
when j increased his spending on meritgoods, j would also be discouraged
from spending because i's reaction raises theprice to j.Indeed, j could end
up consuming fewer merit goods than he would if i were not concerned!That
these induced reactions are not simplyhypothetical nor always minor is per-
suasively shown in a recent study of higher education.h42States earmark
transfers to higher education mainly throughhighly subsidized public insti-
tutions. Private spending was apparently reducedby (at least) 75 cents per
dollar of public spending in 1966-67;private spending may have been reduced
by more than a dollar per dollar of publicspending in 1959-60, so that total
spending on higher education in that year would have beenreduced by public
spending.
Both i and j want to limit the induced reactionsof the other because
such reactions reflect the incent'ive
to "underreveal" preferences about meritgoods
and "free-ride" in their consumption. Sinceequation (3.7) shows that these reactions
raise the price of merit goods to i and j, ineffect, both want to lower these
prices. Indeed, it is well-known from thetheory of public goods, and a merit
good is a particular kind of "public" good,
that efficient prices to i and j would be
less than the market price; indeed, theseefficient prices would sum to the
market price of the merit Efficient prices might be achieved, for
example, by i and j matching each other's spending inspecified proportions,-28-
or each might be given a spendingquota.
I Intentionally say "might" beachieved because any agreement hato be
"policed" to insure that each livesup to his commitment.Policing
is relatively easy for theconsumer of the merit goods, j, since heusually
automatically knows how much is spent by I, but ismuch more difficult for i
Since he does not automatically know how
much is spent by j4 Parentsmay use
their children's grades in school tomeasure the input of time and effort by
children that presumably "matches" themoney contribution by the parents.'
Or parents may save a largepart of their total transfer to children fora be-
quest when they die in order to provide an incentivefor children to spend
"appropriately" at least while theirparents are alive.46This may explain
why the inheritance tax on bequestsapparently has induced relatively little
substitution toward gifts to children.4
The "underrevealing", "free-riding",coordination of efforts, and "policing"
discussed for merit goods are common to all
multi-person interactiors; i.e., all
situations where two or morepersons are affected by the consumption, attitudes,
or other behavior of the same person. Theanalytical issues for multi-person
interactions are the same as for other "public"goods:is public intervention
desirable -forexample, should charitable giving be deductible frompersonal
income in arjvjng at tax liabilities inorder to lower the private price of
giving—, and do private equilibria without government interventionmore
closely approximate joint maximization, a Nash
non-cooperative game solution,or
something quite different? Since space is limited, Irefrain from discussing





An envious or maliciousperson presumably would feel better off if some other
persons become worse off in certain respects. He could "harm"
himself (i.e., spend
his own resources) on harming others: inFigure 2.2, he gives upk0 units of
his own consumption in order to harmothers by h0 units. The terms of trade
between his own harm and the harm toothers, given by the curveE0S0 in Figure
2.2, is partly determined by his skill at"predatory" behavior, and partly by
public and private expenditures toprevent crime, libeling, malicious acts, tres-
pass, and other predatory behavior. Since an increasein these expenditures
would increase the cost to him ofharming others, he would be discouraged from
harming them. Only limited evidence is availableon predatory expenditures,
but what is does support thisimplication of the theory. Crimesagainst
persons provide some evidence on predatory behaviorsince most assaults and
murders probably are motivated by the harmto victims8 The frequency of assaults
and murder (and also crimes againstproperty) apparently are stronglynegatively
related to the probability of
conviction, punishments, and other measures of the
cost of committing these crimes
Section 2 suggests that a rise inown income would tend to reducepre-
datory expenditures. An increase in the social environment,50
on the other hand, would necessarily increase
these expenditures, unless owncon-
sumption were an inferior good. Therefore,a rise in the social environment and
own income by the same per cent would reduce
predatory expenditures by less
than would a rise in own incomealone, and might even increase them.
Again, the implications of the theorycan be tested with evidence on crimes
against persons. Since assaults and murdershave been more frequent at lower
income levels,51 an increase inown income appears to reduce crimes againstper--30-
sons, if differences in own income alone are measured by differences in the
incomes of individuals at a moment in time(as in the discussion of charity
in section 3B). As predicted by the theory,an increase in own income that
is accompanied by an increase in the socialenvironment (as measured by
the income of others) does not have sucha negative effect on these
crimes. Indeed, the frequency of assaults and murders hasnot been reduced by
the sizeable growth in aggregate incomes during the last Oyears, nor do higher
income states presently have fewer crimes againstpersons than other states.52
Over the years, even acute observers of society have differedradically in
their assessment of the importance ofenvy and hatred. Two hundred years ago,
for example, Adam Smith recognized these "passions", but shunted themaside with
the comment:53 "Envy, malice, or resentment, are theonly passions which can
prompt one man to injure another in his person or reputation. But thegreater
part of men are not very frequently under the influence of those passions, and
the very worst men are so only occasionally. As theirgratification too, how
agreeable soever it may be to certain characters, is not attended withany real
or permanent advantage it is in the greater part of men commonly restrainedby
prudential considerations. Men may live together in society with some tolerable
degree of security, though there is no civil magistrate to protect them from
the injustice of those passions". (Smith, my italics).To Thorstein
Veblen, on the other hand, writing many years later, these motives are the
very stuff of life that dominate everything else:4 "...the desire for wealth
can scarcely be satiated in any individual instance, and evidently a satiation
of the average or general desire for wealth is out of thequestion. However
widely, or equally, or 'fouly', it may be distributed, no general increase of
the community's wealth can make any approach to satiating thisneed, the ground
of which is the desire of everyone to exceleveryone else in the accumulation S
of goods." (Veblen, p.32).—31-
.
Inprinciple, the importance of envy and hatred can be measured using
equation (2.9)by the contribution of the relevant social environment to
social income; this isdone in a crude way In section 2b for charity. Un-
fortunately, not enough information is available either on the own income elas-
ticity of demand or on the fraction of own Income spent on "predatory" be-
havior to make, even crude estimates of the relative contribution of evy
and hatred.
Still, it may be useful to note several implications of the differing
views about the significance of envy and hatred. For example, Veblen's belief
that the welfare of a typical person primarily depends on his relative income
position implies that social income essentially is zero: that the value of
the social environment causing envy would exactly offset the value ofown in-
come For then, andonly then, would a rise in this social environment and
ownincome by the same per cent, prices held constant, not affect social income
or welfare. That is, a rise in all incomes in a community by the same
per cent would not improve anyone's welfare in Veblen's world.55
If social income were negative, if the environment causing envy were more
important than own income, a rise in the environment andown income by the
same per cent would lower social income and welfare. That is, a general rise
in incomes in a more extreme Veblenian world would actually lower welfare!6
On the other hand, Smith's belief that envy is a relatively minor determi-
nant of welfare implies that social income is positive: the environment causing
envy is less important than ownincome. A rise in the environment and own
income by the same per cent would then raise social income and welfare. That
is, Veblen's general rise in the community's income would raise the welfare
of the typical person.-32-
4.mmary
This essay uses simple tools of economic theory to analyze interactions
between the behavior of some persons and different characteristics
of other persons. Although these interactions are emphasized ih thecontemporary
sociological and anthropological literature, and were considered the cornerstone
of behavior by several prominent 19th century economists, they have been largely
ignored in the modern economic literature.
The central concept of the analysis is "social income", the sum of a
person's own income (his earnings, etc) and the monetary value to him of the rele-
vant characteristics of others, which I call his social environment. The optimal
expenditure of his own income to alter these characteristics is given by the
usual marginal conditions. By using the concept of social income, I can analyze
the effect on these expenditures of changes in different sources of income
and in different prices, including the "price" of the social environment.
Perhaps the most important implication, is that a change in own
income alone would tend to cause a relatively large changein these expenditures;
in other words, the own income elasticity of demand forthese expenditures would
tend to be "large", certainly larger than the elasticityresulting from equal
per cent changes in own incomeand the social environment.
Interactions among members of the same family receivethe greatest atten-
tion: The "head" of a familyis defined not by sex or age, but as that member,
if there is one, whb transfers general purchasing power toall other members
because he cares about their welfare. Afamily with ahead is a highly inter-
dependent organization that has the following properties:
A redistribution of income among members would notaffect the consumption
or welfare of any member because it simplyinduces offsetting changes in transfers
from the head. As a result, each member is at least partiallyinsured against
disasters that may strike him..
-33-
Not only the head but other members too act "as if" they "loved" all
members, even when they are really selfish, in the sense that they would
maximize not their own income alone but family income. As it were, the existence
of ahead economizes on the amount of true love required in a family.
A family would act "as if" it maximized a consistent and transitive utility
function subject to a budget constraint that depended only on family variables.
This utility function is the same as the head's not because he has dictatorial
power, but because his concern for the welfare of other members integrates
all their utility functions into one consistent "family" function.
Transfers from parents to children in the form say of schooling,
gifts and bequests tend to be negatively related to what the income of children
would be relative to their parents in the absence of these transfers.
Therefore, the relative income of children inclusive of transfers could be
unrelated or even negatively related to these transfers. Consequently, one
cannot infer anything about the stability across generations of economic or
social positions simply from knowing the relation between parental position and
the amount transferred.
tiore briefly treated are charity and envy, with special attention
to the effects of different kinds of income change on charitable contributions
and expenditures to alleviate envy. For example, the much higher income elas-
ticity of demand for charitable contributions estimated from differences in
individual incomes at a moment in time than from aggregate changes in incomes
over time are shown to be implied by this theory of social interactions, but not
readily by the traditional theory of choice..
Froma methodological viewpoint, theaim of the paper is to showhow
another relation consideredimportant in the sociological
and anthropological
literature can be usefully
analyzed when Incorporated intothe frameworkpro-
vided by economic theoryProbably the main explanation forthe neglect of
social Interactions byeconomists is neither analytical
Intractability nor a
preoccupation with more Important
concepts, but excessive attention toformal
developments during the last 70years. As a consequence, even,
concepts con-
sidered to be important
by earlier economists, suchas social interactions,
have been shunted aside.
.-35-
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Footnotes .
1SeeBenthamChapter V, and Marshall, Book III,Chapter II.
2Quoted in Marshallp. 87.
3Marshall.He limits his discussion ofconsumer demand to the largely
formal theory of marginaltheory because of the importance heattaches to the
interaction between activities,consumer behavior and the basic wants: "...such
a discussion of demand as is possible
at this stage of our work must beconfined
to an elementary analysis ofan almost purely formal kind." (p. 90).He never
developed the more complicated and lessformal analysis.
4See
Pigou, Fisher, p. 102, Pantejeoni (Iowe this reference to George
Stigler.)
5See
e.g., Duesenbery, Johnson, orBrady and Friedman.
6SeeLeibenstein.





Other drafts that were alsocirculated include Becker l968a
13Foran exposition of this theory see Michaeland Becker.
have also developed theanalysj assumingmany commodities and
many characteristics-39-
15Sociologistssometimes assert that variables like social approval
and respect "do not have any material value on which a price canbe put..."•
(seeBlau). But prices measure only scarcity, and have nothing in-
trinsically to do with "material value": R' for example, only measures the re-
source cost to i of changing social approval, respect,etc.
assume for simplicity in this formula that measures the marginal
as well as average price of R.
171f he can also reduce R by giving up own goods, the curve E0S0
would continue in the south-west direction (see ES in thefigure). How-
ever, this section would be irrelevantif R had positive marginal utility.
differentiating equation (2.6) with respect to alone,
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and I am assuming that, is given (not dependent on h, x, etc.).Of course,
the weighted average of income elasticities with respect to a change in Si must
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increase in a lowersbecause the relative contribution of own




Ra — — da n n
Both terms are greater than zero because <1,and .-< 0(this is shown da
shortly); therefore, dflh
>0.
23The endowment-incomeelasticity of demand for contributions can
easily be showntoequal
dh D Nh = = - 1)[-(1+a(--1)) ]+ 1.
Clearly, when a >0,Nh <0if a =N,the average endowment-income
elasticity of demand; and when a <0,Nh >0if NR a
24 assume thatan increase in the absolute value of reduces the demand
for R, so that Eh >0.
25
Caring is not simply a deus ex machina introducedto derive the
following implications since I have shown
elsewhere (Becker, 1974) that the
marriage market is more likely to paira person with someone he cares about
than with an otherwise similarperson that he does not care about.-1l-
.
26If the utility of i also partly depended directly on the amounts he
transferred to j, perhaps because 's "prestige" or "approval" partly depended
on these transfers, then redistribution of family income would have a net
effect on the consumption of both i and j.
27A somewhat weaker assumption is that the family is "fully
connected" through a series of transfers between members; for example,
a transfers resources to b because a cares about b,b transfers to c
because b cares about c, and so on until m transfers to the lastmember n,
and n transfers to no one (this assumption is made in an intergenerational
context by Barro). Indirectly, a (or any other member but n)
would be transferring to all members because an increase in hiscontributions
to b would induce an increase in the contributions toall other members.
28The interaction between self and market insurance is analyzed in
Ehrlich and Becker.
29This application is taken from the detailed discussion in Barro.
30The empirical evidence does strongly suggest that most of the invest-
ment in higher education by state governments has beenoffset by reduced
private investment (see Peltzman, andMcPherson)
31The incentive that parents have to invest in their children is dis-
cussed in several places (see e.g., De Tray, andParsons).
.-42-
. 3laTheCoase Theorem proves that when "bargaining costs"are negligible,
each family member could always be induced to maximizefamily oppo-rtunities
through bargaining with and side payments from other members.I have proved
that the head (and, as shown later, other members too) hasthis incentive
and, in effect, makes or receives "side payments" withoutbargaining with
other members. The word "automatically" is usedto distinguish this
theorem from the Coase Theorem.
32Although this is a rather immediate implication of his interest
in maximizing family opportunities, a direct proof may be instructive.
Suppose that a particular action changed the utility of the head by
n
dlJh mudx +
E mudx., (1 )
j=l
where mu = , and dx. measures the change in consumption of the jth
J
j
familymember.If the head can transfer resources to other members dollar
for dollar, in equilibrium,
mu =
XhPj
all j, (2 )
where is the marginal utility of income to the head, and p is the cost




Xh phd)ch + p.dx.)= E p.dx.. (3 )
J=l,h '- allj
-
Sincethe head takes anactiorrif and only if, dUh >0,equation (3 )
implies(since Ah >0)that he takes an action if, and only if,
E P.dX >0, (4')
all j
-
which was to be proved..
32aRecallthat I have been assuming that only a single goodis consumed
by each person, although this analysis presupposesmany goods. The transition
to many goods is straightforwardif the head's utility depends on a function
of the various goods consumed by anothermember that is monotonically re-
lated to the utility function of that member(see the discussion later in this
section).
33Itis difficult to contrast my derivation of a "family" utilityfunction
with a traditional derivation since explicit derivations are rare.The most
explicit appears to be in a well-knownarticle on social indifference curves by
Samuelson (1956).Hebriefly considers the problem of relatingindividual and
family utility functions, and perhaps givesthe same derivation as mine. I
say "perhaps" because hisdiscussion is brief, and has
a statement about grafting aconsistent "familywelfare function" onto the
separate utilityfunctions of different family members (p. 10), and someothers
equally unclear.
For example, he said "...(afamily member's) preferences among his own
goods have the special property of being independent ofthe other members
consumption. But since blood is thicker than water, the preferencesof the
different members are interrelated by what might be called a'consensus' or
'social welfare function' which takes into account the deservingness orethical
worths of the consumption levels of each of the members". (Ibid) How arethese
preferences interrelated by a "consensus", and why not simply incorporate
S.-Ii4_
•
the "deservingness" of the consumption levels of different membersinto some
members' preferences (as in my approach)? Incidentally,at one poirlt(p. 9),Samuelson
appears to believe that if the family utility function is the same•as the head's,
he must have sovereign power, which I have shown to bewrong.
He later (p. 20)says that "if within the family therecan be assumed to take
place an optimal reallocation of Income so as to keep each member's dollar
expenditure of equal ethical worth, then there can be derived for the whole fa-
mily a set of well-behaved indifference contours relating the totals of what
it consumes: the family can be said to act as if it maximizes sucha group
preference function" (italics in original).In my analyses, the "optimal re-
allocation" results from interdependent preferences andvoluntary contributions,
and the "group preference function" is identical to that of the "head".





where x. and x. are the own consumption of i and j, and9. and g. are monotonic
functions of the utility indexes U. and Ui,, results ininstability and unbounded
utility levels:. For, it is argued, an increase in x. by one unitdirectly raises
i's utIlity, which raises j's Ut1itythrough g. ,whichin turn further raises
i's ut iii ty, and so on
until U. and U. approach infinity.
Mathematically, there is an infiniteregress
since, by substitution,
=
UEx., x., g. { x, {
'j' g {....}]
However,with appropriate restrictionson the magnitude of the interactions,
the infinite regress hasa finite effect, and the "reduced forms" of
U and Uj on
x. and x. are well defined. Consider, for








where a1 arid a presumably are > 0, and b1 andb. can either be > or < 0.
By substitution,
a. ab. ____ JI
l-b.b. l-b.b. cz..
u = x I J =)I)(I
i 1 I J
a.b. a. Ii _
l-b.b. l-b.b. c. f.
U =x - x - = ç•J
j j I J
where b.b. is independent of monotonic transformations on U. and U.. A
finite sum to the regress requires that lb.b.l < 1; essentially, that the
marginal utilities or disutilities due to interdependence are less than
unity. Note that a1though it is possible for a. =b.and a. b.., for own
consumption and the welfare of the other person to be equally "important",
the conditionbbI < 1 imp] ies that either > .j,or or both:
that is, for at least one of the persons, own consumption has to be more
important than the other person's consumption in the "reduced forms".
.-46-
351n onestudy, the elasticity of children'syears of school ing with
respect to parental income is a sizeable +1.2, at thesame time that the
elasticity of children's income withrespect to parental income is only
or a 70 per cent regression toward themean (unpublished calculations
by Jacob Mincer from the Eckland Sample).
Note in this regard, however, thatparents cannot easily prevent
considerable regression toward themean by investing in their children.
For let the relation between the humancapital invested in children and
parental income be
S=a+b logI+u,
where b is the elasticity ofparental response, and urepresents other
determinants of S. According to thetheory of investment in human capi-
tal (Mincer; Becker, 1975),
logia+rS +v, c c
where r is the rate of returnon human capital, and v represents other deter-
minants of log I. Then by substitution
log Tc(a + ra) + rb log I + (ru + v).
Even if r were as large as .2, and bas large as2.0,rb would only be
.4: the regression toward themean would be 60 per cent.
If vc log I + v', where I-c measures thedegree of "intrinsic"
regression to the mean, then by substitution,
.
-
logI =(a+ ra) + (rb + c) log I+(ru +v')
Since the analysis in the text implies that b would bepositively related to
1cas parents try to offset the "intrinsic"regression, the "observed" re-
gression to the mean,
-y 1 -(c+ rb) =(1-c)-rb,
may be only weakly related to the "intrinsic"regression lc.I am indebted to discussions with Jacob Mincer on the issues sketchily
covered in this footnote.
35a .Itis generally believed that the United States has a more mobile
"open"society than European countries do, yet (admittedly crude) comparisons
of occupational mobility between fathers and sons do not reveal large dif-
ferences between the United States and several Western European countries
(Upset and Bendix). Since the analysis in this paper suggests that parental
contributions to their children's education and other training is more
responsive to parental position in "open" societies, more responsive parental
contributions may be offsetting the greater "openness" of American society.
6The Random House Dictionary defines charity as "the benevolent feeling,
especially toward those in need or in disfavor".
37The utility function of a charitable person who desires to improve the
general well-being of recipients can be written as
I.÷h
u. =U.[x., x.(= )I'
whereh is his charitable giving,x
measures the well-being of recipients,
U. U.
and > 0;that is, a unit increase in the own income of reci-
pients has the same effect on the utility, of a charitable person as a unit
increase in his giving.
The utility function of a person who makes"charitable contributions






where still -—> 0
-anincrease in his contributions wouldincrease his-148-
acclaim-,but now the sign ofU1/I. is. not so obvious.If, however, contri-
butions and the income of recipients were muchcloser substitutes for each
other than for the own consumption of thecontributor, which is plausible, then
these utility functions have similarimplications.
Not
much generality is sacrificed, therefore,by only considering charity
motivated by a desire to improve thewell-being of recipients.
8eeTaussig. These estimates are net of differences in taxrates. Note,
however, that charitable giving is estimated fromitemized deductions in personal income
- Ataxreturns. Since only giving to (certain) institutions andnot to individuals
can be deducted, since many taxpayers, especially with lowerincomes, do not
itemize their deductions, and since others inflatetheir deductions, the response
of tax-reported giving may notaccurately describe the response of actual giving.
39Schwartz'sstudy, like Taussig's, is based on personal income tax returns
(see Schwartz). Both studies also estimate theprice elasticity of
giving, where price is measured by one minus themarginal tax rate.
Schwartz finds considerable response to price, elasticitiesgenerally exceeding
-.5,which is consistent with the implications of thetheory of social
interactions. Taussig, on the other hand, findsonly a weak response to price,
but Schwartz argues that Taussig'sfindings are biased downward.
140
It is easily shown that
r. = 1—vn
j mm
where V is the share spent on meritgoods, n their income elasticity, and
rthe reduction in j's own spendingper unit increase in i's contribution.
Therefore, if v =.2,and n =2.0, r. 0.6. m m j
I+lForexample, if jspends60 cents less for each dollar transferredby
I, the price to i would be
=m—i;- =2.5
or more than twice the market price.-49-
42See Peltzman.
43 .
Aproof of thiswell-known summation formula can be found in Samuelson,
1954.
hThe difficulty of policing "merit" goods is shown amusingly in a recent
Wizard of Id cartoon. Two drunks meet and one says "Could you spare a buck for
a bottle of wine?" The other answers, "How do I know you won't buy food with
it?"
45
Iowe this example to Lisa Landes.
Li6Thjs conclusion about theincentives provided by large bequests is a
special case of a more general result proven elsewhere (see Becker-Stigler) that
relatively large pensions discourage employees from acting contrary to the in-
terests of their employers ( abequest serves the same purpose as a pension)
the discussion in Shoup and Adams
robberies, burglaries and larcenies, on the other hand, probably are
motivated by the prospects of material gain.
4ee Ehrlich
50That is, in that part of the social environment that motivates predatory
expend i tures.
51Persons committing crimes against other persons as well as against pro-
perty are much more likely to live in low income areas
(see the Task Force
Report of the Crime Commission a, Table 9).
S-50-
52
Therate of assaults grew significantly from 1933 -65 Inthe United
States, and the murder rate remained about thesame (Task Force Report of the
Crime Commission b, Figures 3 and 4).Higher income states do not have fewer
crimes against persons even when theprobability of conviction, the puiiishi€.ii
andseveral other variables are held constant (Ehrlich, Tables25) Mote
that Ehrlich's study, unlike the evidence from theCrime Commission, holds
the "price" of crime constant whenestimating the effects of income (and holds
income constant when estimating the effects ofprice).
53Not muchlater, Jeremy Benthari reached a similar conclusion: "Thep1e-
sure derivable by any person from the contemplation ofpain suffered by another,
is in no instanceso great as the pain so suffered."
(Bentham b).
54.
Similarly,a sociologist recently has argued thatenvy is a powerful
motive in primitive as well as advancedsocieties, communist as well as capi-
talist ones, and is critical indetermining economic progress and publicpolicy
(see Schoeck).





where f is the
average community income, then
S. =I.-p
r
where S. is l's social income, andp is the price of Iinterms of T. if






s.x. - L .= o.II-51-
6When envy is so important, economic development
is undesirable because
it lowers welfare. See
Schoeck's discussion of what hecafls "the envybarrier
of the developing countries".
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